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Abstract
The continual growth of network traﬃc rates results in heavy traﬃc processing
overloads, and a typical solution is to partition traﬃc into multiple network
processors for parallel processing especially in software-deﬁned networks. This
paper proposes an eﬃcient and robust network traﬃc partitioning scheme called
DTP-ICM, which dynamically distributes packet traﬃc with ﬂow granularity,
and assigns a new ﬂow to a network processor with the lightest traﬃc load
level. The scheme is ﬁrst improved by building an initial connection separation
mechanism to isolate false TCP connections, which results in the initial connec-
tion table (ICT) and the established connection table (ECT). The move-to-front
heuristic is applied to the ECT table and the UDP ﬂow table to accelerate their
lookups and to the ICT table for fast timeout scanning. Besides, the ICT table
is optimized with counting bloom ﬁlters to defend against SYN ﬂooding attacks.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of our DTP-ICM scheme with real network
traﬃc traces by experiments. Experimental results indicate that the DTP-ICM
scheme outperforms the traditional ones in terms of traﬃc load balance, packet
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distribution eﬃciency and robustness against malicious behaviors.
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1. Introduction
The continual growth of network bandwidth leads to the fact that a sin-
gle network device cannot real-timely process large-scale packet traﬃc, espe-
cially in high-speed networks with bandwidth 1Gps and above. A typical
solution is load balancing, which partitions heavy network traﬃc into many5
parts and forwards them to multiple network processors for parallel processing.
Network traﬃc partitioning is a key to load balancing, and has been exten-
sively applied in network applications, such as stateful ﬁrewalling[1], intrusion
detection[2][3], traﬃc measurement[4], high-speed packet switching[5], and con-
tent delivery[6][7]. In particular, emerging network paradigms such as software-10
deﬁned networking[8][9] make load balancing much easier to be deployed without
changing substrate devices by using OpenFlow[10][11].
Network traﬃc partitioning in these applications is generally required to
satisfy the following properties. Firstly, network traﬃc must be partitioned
with ﬂow granularity to support packet processing at session levels above the15
network layer[12][13]. In particular, all packets within a ﬂow must be assigned to
an identical network processor. For convenience, the terms ﬂow and session will
be used interchangeably in this paper, and both refer to packet traﬃc between
two communication endpoints in networks, particularly called connection for
TCP. Secondly, network traﬃc should be dynamically partitioned in terms of20
the processing capacities of network processors to achieve good load balance.
Thirdly, each packet must be distributed at fast speeds to real-timely process
large-scale network traﬃc even in the presence of malicious attacks.
There exist many network traﬃc partitioning schemes, which can be clas-
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siﬁed into three types: direct hashing[14][15], hash space division[18] and ﬂow25
table based dynamic schemes[21][22][23][24]. The direct hashing schemes map
each packet to a network processor by a hash function, which is only suitable
for network processors with identical conﬁgurations. The hash space division
schemes divide the hash space into many intervals assigned to network proces-
sors in terms of their processing capacities. This type adapts to heterogeneous30
network processors, but is still hard to achieve good load balance due to no con-
sideration of non-uniform distribution of network traﬃc. The ﬂow table based
dynamic schemes maintain a hash table of simultaneous ﬂows, and dynamically
distribute packet traﬃc with ﬂow granularity to multiple network processors.
This type keeps ﬂow integrity during packet distribution and balances traﬃc35
load well among network processors. However, their packet distribution per-
formance becomes a great challenge when they are manipulated in high-speed
networks especially in the presence of malicious behaviors.
Many literatures to date have achieved a deep insight into the load balancing
capacity of dynamic traﬃc partitioning[21][22][23][24]. Unfortunately, there is40
few research work to optimize the packet distribution performance to the best of
our knowledge. Chen et al.[17] dynamically remapped the ﬂow bundle with the
least number of TCP ﬂows to the lightest loaded processing unit when traﬃc
load became imbalanced between processing units. Sun et al.[18] mapped each
incoming packet by hashing its key header ﬁelds to an interval allocated for an45
processing unit, and the interval was ﬁne-tuned in terms of processing capacity
and current load of all processing units. These methods achieve real-time traﬃc
load balance, but will lead to frequent load migration due to bursty network
traﬃc. Shi et al.[19] classiﬁed Internet ﬂows into two categories: the aggressive
and the normal, and applied dynamic scheduling policies to the aggressive ﬂows.50
Kencl et al.[20] designed a feedback control mechanism to prevent processor
overload, and provided an adaptive extension of the highest random weight
(HRW) scheme to cope with biased traﬃc patterns. These schemes achieve
good load balancing and high processor utilization, but do not help to stand
against malicious behaviors such as SYN ﬂooding attacks.55
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This paper focuses on how to optimize the packet distribution performance
of dynamic traﬃc partitioning scheme. The optimization is investigated with
the following methodology. We ﬁrst give the framework of dynamic network
traﬃc partitioning scheme, and improve its ﬂow table management by splitting
the hash table of TCP connections. Then, all ﬂow tables are optimized by60
employing heuristic methods to speed up their lookups and timeout scanning.
As a key step, we resist against SYN ﬂooding attacks by applying counting
bloom ﬁlters to the lookups of the initial connection table. Finally, we give
the algorithm implementation of our proposed traﬃc partitioning scheme, and
evaluate its packet distribution performance with real network traﬃc traces.65
With the above methodology, we aims to achieve the following conclusions
as the main contributions of this paper: (a) Giving the framework of dynamic
traﬃc partitioning scheme, which reaches real-time traﬃc load balance with
the guarantee of ﬂow granularity; (b) Building the initial connection separation
mechanism to improve ﬂow table management performance by dividing the TCP70
connection table into the initial connection table (ICT) and the established
connection table (ECT); (c) Optimizing the ICT table lookups of TCP SYN
packets by employing counting bloom ﬁlters to defend against SYN ﬂooding
attacks; (d) Applying the move-to-front heuristic to accelerate the lookups of
the ECT table and the UDP ﬂow table, and the timeout scanning of the ICT75
table.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
the related work. Section 3 describes the fundamental principle of our pro-
posed traﬃc partitioning scheme DTP-ICM, whose ﬂow table management is
improved by building the initial connection separation mechanism. In Section80
4, we optimize the two resultant TCP connection tables and the UDP ﬂow table
by employing the move-to-front heuristic and counting bloom ﬁlters. Section 5
describes the algorithm implementation of the DTP-ICM scheme, whose per-
formance is evaluated with physical network traﬃc traces in Section 6. Section
7 concludes the paper.85
4
2. Related Work
In the last decade, there have been many literatures on traﬃc load balancing
in various network applications. Most of their work focused on the load balanc-
ing capacity of network traﬃc partitioning, but rarely contributed to the packet
distribution performance, especially robustness against malicious behaviors.90
Cao et al.[15] designed a table-based hashing scheme for the scenario of sev-
eral network processors with diﬀerent capacities in Internet traﬃc load balanc-
ing. The scheme splits a traﬃc stream into multiple bins mapped into outgoing
links based on an allocation table. However, the algorithm has poor adapt-
ability of load balance, and it has been pointed out that hashing alone is not95
able to balance network traﬃc workload[19]. Lai et al.[16] proposed a traﬃc
partitioning algorithm for parallel intrusion detection systems. They employed
hash table to maintain simultaneous TCP connections, and partitioned network
traﬃc in virtue of TCP connection state. The algorithm provides better load
balancing capacity than direct hashing schemes. However, it does not con-100
sider TCP state accurately, and ruins the integrity of connection context during
packet scheduling.
Chen et al.[17] presented a session-oriented adaptive load balancing algo-
rithm based on IP header multi-ﬁeld classiﬁcation. The algorithm dynamically
adjusts ﬂow bundles to guarantee session integrity when traﬃc load becomes105
imbalanced between processing units. To keep dynamic balance between pro-
cessing units, they remapped the ﬂow bundle with the least number of TCP
ﬂows to the lightest loaded processing unit. Sun et al.[18] provided a novel
load balancing algorithm for parallel intrusion detection systems. The algo-
rithm maps each incoming packet by hashing its key header ﬁelds to an interval110
allocated for an IDS sensor. The interval is ﬁne-tuned in terms of processing ca-
pacity and current load of all IDS sensors to achieve real-time balance of traﬃc
distribution. However, these algorithms will produce frequent ﬂow adjustment
because of bursty network traﬃc, which leads to a lot of load migration between
the sensors.115
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Targeting load balancing between forwarding engines in Internet routers, Shi
et al.[19] classiﬁed Internet ﬂows into two categories: the aggressive and the nor-
mal, and applied dynamic scheduling policies to the aggressive ﬂows to achieve
both load balancing and eﬃcient system resource utilization. Kencl et al.[20]
presented an adaptive load balancing scheme for load sharing among multiple120
network processors within a router. They designed a feedback control mecha-
nism to prevent processor overload, and provided an adaptive extension of the
highest random weight (HRW) scheme to cope with biased traﬃc patterns. The
scheme achieves signiﬁcant improvement in processor utilization, and minimizes
the probability of ﬂow reordering by exploiting the minimal disruption property125
of the adjustment of the packet-to-processor mapping.
Li et al.[21] proposed an application-based dynamic-least-load-ﬁrst algorithm
for high-speed network intrusion detection systems. They real-timely main-
tained a hash table of all assigned sessions and dynamically scheduled new ses-
sions in terms of current load levels of all intrusion analyzers. Jiang et al.[22][23]130
discussed a ﬂow-based dynamic traﬃc partitioning algorithm for intrusion de-
tection systems in high-speed networks. The algorithm divides packet stream
with ﬂow granularity and forwards a packet of a new session to the detection
engine with the least load currently. Xiong et al.[24] dynamically maintains a
hash table of concurrent sessions, and assigns a session to a network processor135
with the lightest load level when the session appears. These algorithms achieve
good eﬀect of traﬃc load balancing, but their packet distribution performance
is not adequately considered.
To achieve better load balancing performance in high-speed networks, this
paper proposes an eﬃcient and robust dynamic network traﬃc partitioning140
scheme. In the scheme, we ﬁrst build the initial connection separation mech-
anism to isolate false TCP connections especially induced by SYN ﬂooding
attacks, which results in the initial connection table (ICT) and the established
connection table (ECT). As a further step, the move-to-front heuristic is applied
to the ECT table and the UDP table to accelerate their lookups and to the ICT145
table for fast timeout scanning. Moreover, the ICT table is optimized by em-
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ploying counting bloom ﬁlters to defend against the attacks. By this way, we
aim to boost the packet distribution performance of dynamic traﬃc partitioning
scheme.
3. Dynamic Traﬃc Partitioning Scheme150
This section describes the framework of our dynamic traﬃc partitioning
scheme and divides its TCP connection table into two tables by building an ini-
tial connection separation mechanism for good packet distribution performance.
3.1. Framework
Many network applications relating to stateful packet processing usually em-155
ploy load balancing technology to cope with massive packet traﬃc. One of their
key problems is traﬃc partitioning scheme. The traﬃc partitioning scheme in
stateful packet processing usually needs to satisfy the following properties[12]:
(a) ﬂow granularity. Network traﬃc must be partitioned with ﬂow granularity
to support packet processing at semantic levels; (b) dynamic balance. Net-160
work traﬃc should be dynamically partitioned to achieve real-time load balance
among all network processors; (c) fast distribution. Each arrived packet must
be distributed at fast speeds to real-timely process large-scale network traﬃc;
(d) good robustness. The traﬃc partitioning scheme should perform soundly
even in the presence of malicious behaviors.165
This paper proposes a novel dynamic traﬃc partitioning scheme based on
ﬂow tables, which aims to meet the above properties. We ﬁrst give the basic
idea of our traﬃc partitioning scheme as follows. We maintain simultaneous
ﬂows of each protocol above IP in a separate hash table. Each ﬂow in a table is
associated with a network processor assigned at its appearance. In particular,170
we assign a new ﬂow to a network processor with the lightest traﬃc load level,
and all packets within the ﬂow are forwarded to the network processor. To
determine the lightest loaded network processor, we build the load state table
to real-timely maintain the traﬃc load states of all network processors.
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According to the above basic idea, we further illustrate the fundamental prin-175
ciple of our traﬃc partitioning scheme in Fig.1. Suppose there are N network
processors, and the traﬃc partitioner maintains a ﬂow table with the length
H. As for a continuous stream of network packets (p1, p2, · · · , pi, · · ·), the traﬃc
partitioner forwards them in terms of their arrival orders. With regard to a
speciﬁc packet pi, we get its ﬂow identiﬁer from its header ﬁelds and map the180
identiﬁer to an entry of the ﬂow table FTh(0≤h≤H − 1). Then, we look up the
ﬂow list in the entry FTh for a match fh,j. If the lookup succeeds, we directly
forward the packet to the network processor NPn(0≤n≤N − 1), whose number
n is kept in the ﬂow fh,j . Otherwise, the packet pi is supposed to belong to
a new ﬂow. In this case, the ﬂow is assigned to the lightest-loaded network185
processor NPm(0≤m≤N −1) in terms of the load state table LST , which keeps
real-time load information of each network processor. Meanwhile, we register
the ﬂow and its assigned network processor number m in the ﬂow table FT .
Finally, the packet pi is forwarded to the network processor NPm.
1
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Figure 1: The fundamental principle of our traﬃc partitioning scheme.
Dynamic traﬃc partitioning at the micro level is to distribute each incoming190
packet to a network processor. As seen from the above fundamental principle,
the essential operation of packet distribution is the ﬂow table lookup, which
chieﬂy depends on ﬂow table management. A typical way of ﬂow table man-
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agement is to maintain all simultaneous ﬂows of each protocol in the IP header
with a single hash table, called single ﬂow table (SFT) scheme. This scheme195
works well for 100Mbps networks or below, since their bandwidth limits the ﬂow
tables to be within an acceptable size. However, the ﬂow tables will be much
larger in high-speed networks with bandwidth 1Gbps and above, where there
are up to hundreds of thousands of simultaneous ﬂows[25]. Fortunately, their
lookup overheads can still be limited by selecting a biggish ﬂow table length.200
Suppose there are up to 106 (about 220) simultaneous ﬂows for a transport-layer
protocol such as TCP or UDP, its ﬂow table will have the load factor only 16 if
its table length is conﬁgured as 216, and its lookup overheads will be apparently
acceptable with uniform hashing.
Unfortunately, the SFT scheme can no longer perform soundly in the pres-205
ence of malicious behaviors such as SYN ﬂooding attacks. Such attacks subvert
ﬂow table management by inducing an avalanche of false TCP connections into
the TCP ﬂow table. Despite these false connections can be eliminated in a
short time by timeout mechanism, the TCP ﬂow table still has to accommodate
a large number of unexpired connections besides of massive normal connections.210
This results in its heavy lookup overheads with the addition of highly intensive
packets in high-speed networks. Besides, the huge TCP ﬂow table has to be
frequently traversed to clear out expired connections due to the presence of ma-
licious attacks. This leads to its additional heavy timeout scanning overheads.
In summary, the TCP ﬂow table will face great challenges under network at-215
tacks on the account of its too heavy lookup and timeout scanning overheads.
Therefore, it is necessary to optimize ﬂow table management for better packet
distribution performance.
3.2. TCP Connection Table Division
Malicious behaviors such as SYN ﬂooding attacks have destructive impact220
on ﬂow table management especially TCP connection table. The attackers bring
a great amount of false connections into the table by intensively sending spoofed
SYN packets, and make the table expand rapidly and its operation overheads
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rise sharply. Note that all false connections induced by such attacks will not
complete three-way handshake to establish a TCP connection. In virtue of this225
feature, we build an initial connection separation (ICS) mechanism to isolate
false connections from normal connections. The essential concept of the ICS
mechanism is to separate initial connections including all false connections from
the TCP connection table and manipulate them separately. As for its implemen-
tation level, we run two TCP connection tables: (a) the initial connection table230
(ICT), whose connections have been initiated but not yet completed the three-
way handshake; (b) the established connection table (ECT), whose connections
have been established.
According to the above scheme, we illustrate the lifetime of a TCP connec-
tion in our connection management as Fig.2. When a new connection appears,235
its record will be generated into the ICT table. Once the connection is estab-
lished, the record will be immediately transferred to the ECT table. When the
connection is terminated, we will delete the record from the ECT table. Subse-
quently, a TCP connection is manipulated as follows on the arrival of a packets.
When a SYN packet appears, we create its connection and insert it into the240
ICT table. If the third handshake ACK arrives, we take the connection out of
the ICT table and put it in the ECT table. Once the last packet ACK arrives,
we remove the connection from the ECT table. In addition, whenever a RST
packet resetting a connection arrives, we immediately delete its connection from
the ICT table or the ECT table.245
The above ICS mechanism results in controllable size of both the ICT table
and the ECT table. The ICT table contains a small amount of connections
under normal conditions, due to the fact that 93% and 99% of TCP connec-
tions respectively take less than 1 second and 4 second to complete three-way
handshake[26][27]. When network attacks appear, we strive to limit the inﬂating250
ICT table by setting a small timeout interval (e.g. 1 second), which eliminates
false connections as early as possible. Then the ICT table maintains a con-
trollable number of false connections produced during the interval, besides of
normal initial connections. Fortunately, the ECT table is immune to malicious
10
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Figure 2: The lifecycle of a connection in the ICS mechanism.
behavior and always kept within an acceptable size even in high-speed networks.255
When a TCP packet arrives, its connection resides in either the ICT table or
the ECT table in most cases. Therefore, we only need to look up one of the two
connection table generally, and the lookup overheads will be greatly reduced. In
summary, the ICS mechanism divides single oversize TCP connection table into
two controllable tables, and makes network attacks much easier to cope with.260
4. Flow Table Optimization
This section optimizes ﬂow tables by applying the move-to-front (MTF)
heuristic and counting bloom ﬁlters for high lookup eﬃciency and good robust-
ness against malicious behaviors.
4.1. Table Operation Analysis265
As seen from the previous section, our dynamic traﬃc partitioning scheme
runs the ICT and ECT tables for TCP and a single ﬂow table for each other
transport-layer protocol typically UDP. There are two operation types for a
ﬂow table, lookups on packet arrivals and periodic timeout scanning. Then we
analyze the properties of both operations on these ﬂow tables.270
1) The ICT table
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The ICT table keeps a relatively small scale even in high-speed networks
under normal conditions, and performs lookups and traversals at fast speeds.
Thus, the ICT table holds low lookup overheads as it is looked up only for the
three-way handshake packets within a TCP connection. Meanwhile, the table275
also has cheap scanning overheads due to low frequency of timeout scanning
under normal conditions.
When network attacks occur, the ICT table is sharply expanded by an
avalanche of false connections, which leads to its heavy lookup and traversal
overheads. On the one hand, the ICT table is looked up frequently due to the280
emergence of a large number of falsiﬁed packets. On the other hand, we need
to go through the ICT table for all SYN packets including falsiﬁed ones. These
factors result in a signiﬁcant increase in the overall lookup overheads. Since the
dominant SYN packets will not ﬁnd out a connection in the ICT table, we can
try to ﬁnd a way to give their result soon without the table lookup. If the way285
is successfully found, it will decrease the lookup overheads of the ICT table to
a remarkable extent, and alleviate the damage of network attacks to the ICT
table.
As for timeout scanning, the ICT table has to be scanned at high frequency
in the presence of network attacks. This leads to a great raise in its timeout290
scanning overheads. However, it will be much more convenient to clear out false
connections, if each bucket in the ICT table is sorted by the last access time of
its connections. In such case, all expired connections converge on the rear of the
connection list in each bucket, and can be directly deleted from the tail of each
connection list, other than going through the table to ﬁnd them. If we ﬁnd out295
an optimization method to achieve the eﬀect above, it will apparently decrease
the timeout scanning overheads of the ICT table.
2) The ECT table and the UDP ﬂow table
The ECT table and the UDP ﬂow table always keep a large size in high-speed
networks, and perform lookups and traversals at high cost. Fortunately, the300
ECT table is immune to malicious behaviors such as SYN ﬂooding attacks, and
there are rare attacks for UDP to inﬂate its ﬂow table. This leads both tables
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to be scanned at low frequency and results in their moderate timeout scanning
overheads. As for their lookup operations, we need to search the UDP ﬂow table
and the ECT table respectively on the arrival of a UDP packet and each TCP305
packet except the three-way handshake ones. So both tables will be looked up
frequently due to intensive packet traﬃc in high-speed networks. These factors
lead to their heavy lookup overheads, which need to be optimized. Network
traﬃc investigations indicate that packet traﬃc exhibit locality phenomenon
in packet switched networks. A common observation is that 10% of the hosts310
account for 90% of the traﬃc[28][29]. The locality becomes increasingly evident
with the widespread application of peer-to-peer technologies[30][31]. The local-
ity is manifested as packets arrive in group with regard to a ﬂow, and means
for the ﬂow table lookups that a ﬂow in the table will be successively referenced
in a short time. In other words, if the referred ﬂow is adjusted to the head of315
the table after every lookup, the lookup for subsequent packets will be much
faster to locate their ﬂows. Therefore, we exploit the locality by applying the
move-to-front heuristic to the ECT table and the UDP ﬂow table for better
lookup performance.
4.2. Move-to-front Heuristic320
As seen from the above analysis of ﬂow table operations, we can apply the
move-to-front (MTF) heuristic[32] to optimize the lookups of the ECT table and
the UDP ﬂow table and the timeout scanning of the ICT table. In particular,
for each time that the lookup of a ﬂow table hits a ﬂow, the ﬂow is shifted to
the front of its located list in the table. Fig.3 illustrates the working principle325
of a ﬂow list applying the move-to-front heuristic. Fig.3(a) gives a schematic of
the ith list just before the arrival of a packet on ﬂow ”X”, and Fig.3(b) gives a
schematic of the list just after the arrival. Note that ﬂow ”X” has been pulled
to the front of the list. Table.1 demonstrates the pseudo-code for the operations
on a ﬂow table applying the move-to-front heuristic.330
The MTF heuristic results in a signiﬁcant boost in the lookup performance of
the ECT table and the UDP ﬂow table. Owing to network traﬃc locality, packet
13
...X+1...i 1 2 NX
(a) The ith list before packet arrival
...X+1...i X 1 NX-1
(b) The ith list after packet arrival
Figure 3: The principle of a ﬂow list applying the move-to-front heuristic.
Table 1: The operations on a ﬂow table applying the move-to-front heuristic
The search (including deletion) of a ﬂow table The insertion of a ﬂow table The timeout scanning of a ﬂow table
FT search(FlowTable table, FlowIdentiﬁer key) FT insert(FlowTable table, ﬂow *p) FT timeout(FlowTable table, int interval)
1. pos ← Hash(key) 1. pos ← Hash(p→key) 1. get the current time t cur
2. list ← table[pos].head 2. list ← table[pos].head 2. for i ← 1, table.len do
3. for p ← list.next,&list do 3. p→next ← list.next 3. while TRUE do
4. if p.key = key, then 4. p→prior ← &list 4. p ← table[i].head.prior
5. p→prior→next ← p→next 5. list.next→prior ← p 5. if t cur-p→time > interval, then
6. p→next→prior ← p→prior 6. list.next ← p 6. p→prior→next ← p→next
7. return p 7. return 1 7. p→next→prior ← p→prior
8. return 0 8. keyset ← keyset∪p→key
9. delete p
10. else break
11.return keyset
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ﬂows can be classiﬁed into active ﬂows and inactive ﬂows, which account for a
large and small percentage of packet traﬃc respectively. All frequently referred
ﬂows are shifted to the front of the table after a series of the table lookups. These335
cases result in two consequences: (a) a slight increase in the search length of
inactive ﬂow with a handful of individual packets; (b) a substantial decrease in
the search length of active ﬂow with a mass of successive packets. In conclusion,
the MTF heuristic will bring a great decrease to the lookup overheads of the
ECT table and the UDP ﬂow table.340
Furthermore, the MTF heuristic leads each hash list of the ICT table to
be sorted by the last accessing time of each connection in descending order,
and all expired connections to converge on the rear of each hash list. Thus we
can easily execute timeout scanning by deleting each expired connection from
the tail of all hash lists. With no need to traverse each hash list to get all345
expired connections, the timeout scanning greatly speeds up especially at the
appearance of enormous falsiﬁed connections under SYN ﬂooding attacks. In
conclusion, the MTF heuristic will result in an apparent reduce in the timeout
scanning overheads of the ICT table, which helps to defend against network
attacks.350
4.3. Counting Bloom Filters
The ICT table is sharply expanded and its lookup overheads are rapidly
rising in the presence of SYN ﬂooding attacks. This is attributed to the fact
that the dominant SYN packet looks up the table for its connection in failure.
Since the failed lookups are already known for most of packets, we can employ355
counting bloom ﬁlters to directly give their lookup results without searching the
table.
A bloom ﬁlter[33] is a simple space-eﬃcient data structure for representing
a set in order to support membership queries. A counting bloom ﬁlter[34] gen-
eralizes a bloom ﬁlter data structure so as to allow that the set can be changing360
dynamically via insertions and deletions. Fig.4 illustrates the working principle
of the ICT table employing a counting bloom ﬁlter. It is described by an array
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A of m counters (with several bits), initialized to 0. And It uses k independent
hash functions h1, h2, · · · , hk, each with range {1, · · · ,m}. It has a set C of n
elements c1, c2, · · · , cn, i.e., connection identiﬁers in the ICT table.365
cic
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Figure 4: The principle of the ICT table employing a counting bloom ﬁlter.
If an element c is to be inserted into the set C, the counters A[hi(c)] (1≤i≤k)
at position h1(c), h2(c), · · · , hk(c) in A are incremented by 1 accordingly. If an
element c is to be deleted from the set C, the counters A[hi(c)] at position
h1(c), h2(c), , hk(c) in A are decremented by 1 accordingly. If we want to query
for an element c, we check all the value of the counters A[hi(c)] (1≤i≤k). If any370
of them is 0, then certainly c is not in the set C. Otherwise, we conjecture that
the element c is in the set C, although there is a certain probability that we are
wrong. This is called a ”false positive”. In such case, we still need to search
the ICT table for an exact result. Table.2 summarizes the above discussion
regarding the operations on the ICT table employing a counting bloom ﬁlter.375
The probability for a false positive error is dependent on the parameters k,
m/n. For the counting bloom ﬁlter, after n connections were inserted at random
into the counter array of size m, the probability that a particular counter is 0 is
exactly (1 − 1/m)kn. Hence the probability of a false positive in this situation
is[34][35]380
(
1− (1− 1/m)kn)k≈(1− e−kn/m)k. (1)
The right-hand expression in (1) is minimized for k = ln2 ∗m/n, in which
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Table 2: The operations on the ICT table employing a counting bloom ﬁlter
The search (including deletion) of the ICT table The insertion of the ICT table The timeout scanning of the ICT table
ICT CBF search(FlowIdentiﬁer key) ICT CBF insert(connection *p) ICT CBF timeout(int interval)
1. for i ← 1, k do 1. FT insert(ICT, p) 1. keyset ← FT timeout(ICT, interval)
2. pos ← Hi(key) 2. for i ← 1, k do 2. while keyset=∅ do
3. if CBF [pos] =0, then 3. pos ← Hi(p→key) 3. get a key from keyset
4. break 4. CBF [pos] ← CBF [pos] + 1 4. for i ← 1, k do
5. if i≤k, then 5. return 1 5. pos ← Hi(key)
6. p ← FT search(ICT, key) 6. CBF [pos] ← CBF [pos]− 1
7. if p=NULL, then 7. else break
8. for i ← 1, k do 8. return 1
9. pos ← Hi(p→key)
10. CBF [pos] ← CBF [pos]− 1
11. return p
12.return 0
case the error rate is (1/2)k = (0.6185)m/n. For example, the false positive error
rate is slightly larger than 2.15%, when m/n = 8, k = 6. The false positive error
rate is only 0.314%, when m/n = 12, k = 8.
For the counting bloom ﬁlter, it is also important to know how large the385
memory of the counters can become. In order to determine a good counter size,
we consider this situation: after inserting n connections with k hash functions
into a counter array of size m, the probability that the j th counter is greater or
equal i is
Pr(A[j]≥i) ≤ (enk
im
)i
, (1≤j≤m). (2)
As mentioned above, we can optimize the false positive rate with k = ln2 ∗390
m/n, so we assume that we restrict ourselves to k = ln2 ∗m/n, then
Pr(max
j
A[j] ≥ i) ≤ m(eln2
i
)i
. (3)
If we set 4 bits per counter, the counter will overﬂow if and only if some
counter reaches the value 16. From the above, we know that
Pr(max
j
A[j] ≥ 16) ≤ m(eln2
16
)16 ≈ 1.37× 10−15 ×m. (4)
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Thus, 4 bits per counter will suﬃce for most applications. In conclusion, the
counting bloom ﬁlter is highly eﬀective. With the aid of the counting bloom395
ﬁlter, we can directly tell the lookup results of the ICT table without need to
search any ﬂow table for most SYN packets. As a consequence, the lookup
overheads of the ICT table will be greatly controlled even under SYN ﬂood-
ing attacks. By this way, we signiﬁcantly cut down the damage of malicious
behaviors on the lookup performance of ﬂow tables.400
5. Packet Distribution Algorithm
Our proposed network traﬃc partitioning scheme above is called DTP-ICM,
short for dynamic traﬃc partitioning (DTP) with the initial connection sep-
aration (ICS) mechanism further improved by counting bloom ﬁlters (CBF)
and the move-to-front (MTF) heuristic. This section describes the algorithm405
implementation of the DTP-ICM scheme based on TCP packet classiﬁcation.
5.1. TCP Packet Classiﬁcation
Dynamic traﬃc partitioning at the micro level is packet distribution per-
formed by four basic steps: (a) parsing the packet to get its key ﬁelds and
calculating its ﬂow identiﬁer; (b) looking up the corresponding ﬂow table for a410
match by the ﬂow identiﬁer; (c) distributing the packet to the network processor
in the matched ﬂow or else with the lowest traﬃc load level; (d) operating (cre-
ating, inserting, shifting or deleting) the ﬂow in the ﬂow table after its update.
An essential work of packet distribution is to look up the respective ﬂow table.
There is no doubt for a non-TCP packet since we maintain a respective ﬂow415
table for each protocol above IP header except TCP. As for a TCP packet, we
must determine which table is to be looked up as there are two TCP connection
tables in our scheme. If the lookup fails, we still need to decide whether the
other table should be further searched. To clarify these problems, we classify
TCP packets into ﬁve types as follows.420
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1) Packets with SYN ﬂag. A packet with SYN ﬂag initiates its half of a
TCP connection and appears during connection establishment phase. Thus its
connection must reside in the ICT table if being exists.
2) Packets with FIN ﬂag. A packet with FIN ﬂag tears down its half
of TCP connection and appears during connection termination phase. So its425
connection must be reserved in the ECT table.
3) Packets with RST ﬂag. A packet with RST ﬂag is sent whenever a seg-
ment arrives which apparently is not intended for the current connection. The
packet is generated in 3 typical cases[36]: (a) a connection request is delivered
to a non-existent port. This situation happens at the beginning of connection430
establishment, and its connection must reside in the ICT table; (b) a connec-
tion endpoint abort its connection in response to an unacceptable segment or a
termination command from its application. These causes generally arises at the
end of data transfer, and its connection should stay in the ECT table; (c) one
end detects a half-open connection, whose other end has closed or aborted the435
connection without its knowledge. This case occurs at data transfer phase, and
its connection must be saved in the ECT table.
4) Pure ACK. A pure ACK packet does not carry any payload and key
TCP ﬂags, i.e., SYN, RST and FIN. The packet has three possibilities: (a) the
3rd handshake during connection establishment, whose connection lies in the440
ICT table; (b) an acknowledgement of some transmitted segment during data
transfer phase, whose connection is located in the ECT table; (c) an acknowl-
edgement of connection tear-down request, whose connection also resides in the
ECT table. In summary, its connection is more likely to stay in the ECT table.
Therefore, we will ﬁrst look up the ECT table on its arrival. If the lookup fails,445
we continue to search the ICT table for a match.
5) Impure ACK. An impure ACK packet carries payload but no key TCP
ﬂags (SYN, RST and FIN). The packet usually turns up during data transfer
phase, and its connection must be maintained in the ECT table.
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5.2. Algorithm Description450
Upon receiving a packet, we ﬁrst parse it to get its key ﬁelds with respect
to protocol header format at each layer, and calculate its ﬂow identiﬁer with
its source/destination IP addresses and port numbers deﬁned below. The port
numbers are set as zero for any protocol in which header there is no port num-
ber ﬁeld, such as ICMP. Then we operate the ﬂow table corresponding to the455
protocol in its IP header. As for a non-TCP packet, we directly search the
respective ﬂow table for a match. If we fail to get a match, we create a new ﬂow
and assign it to a network processor with the lightest load degree in terms of
the load state table. Then, we distribute the packet to the network processor,
update the ﬂow with the packet, and insert it to the respective ﬂow table.460
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Flow Endpoint Identiﬁer (FEI)). An endpoint of a net-
work ﬂow can be identiﬁed as a 2-tuple FEI(IP, PT ), where IP and PT re-
spectively represent IP address at the network layer and port number at the
transport layer.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (The relationship of two FEIs). Suppose there are two ﬂow465
endpoints, FEI1(IP, PT ) and FEI2(IP, PT ). Considering IP and PT in
each FEI as a 32-bit and 16-bit integer respectively, we deﬁne the relation-
ship of the two FEIs as FEI1 < FEI2, iﬀ (a) FEI1.IP < FEI2.IP or (b)
FEI1.IP = FEI2.IP and FEI1.PT < FEI2.PT .
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Flow Identiﬁer (FID)). There are two opposite endpoints470
in a ﬂow. Suppose FEIS and FEIB is respectively the smaller and the bigger
of them in accordance with Deniﬁtion 5.2, the ﬂow can be identiﬁed as 2-tuple
FID(FEIS , FEIB).
The distribution of a TCP packet is performed in terms of the packet classiﬁ-
cation above. As for a SYN packet, we search the ICT table with counting bloom475
ﬁlters. If the search fails, the packet is conﬁrmed to initiate a new connection.
Then we create a new connection for it and assign it to a network processor with
the lightest traﬃc load degree. As for a SYN/ACK or RST/ACK packet, we
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directly look up the ICT table for its connection. The ECT table is searched for
any other packet. If the search fails and the packet is a pure ACK, the packet480
is probably the third handshake and we continue to directly look up the ICT
table. Up to now, we are supposed to get a connection. Then, we distribute the
packet to the network processor in the connection and update the connection
with the packet. Finally, the connection is manipulated in terms of its state. In
particular, the connection will be directly deleted if it reaches the termination485
state. Otherwise, we insert it into the ICT table if it is not yet established
and the ECT table for any other case. Table.3 summarizes the above discussion
regarding the packet distribution of our proposed DTP-ICM scheme.
In the meanwhile, the timeout scanning is manipulated on each ﬂow table to
clear out expired ﬂows in time. In particular, the removal of expired ﬂows from490
the ICT table triggers the update of its counting bloom ﬁlter. The timeout
interval of the ICT table is set as 4 second under normal conditions due to
the fact that 99% of TCP connections take less than 4s to complete three-way
handshake. When SYN ﬂooding attacks occur, the interval is tuned to 1 second
as 93% of TCP connections can also be established. As for other ﬂow tables495
including the ECT table and the UDP session table, their timeout intervals are
conﬁgured as 60 second. Table.4 demonstrates the pseudo-code for the ﬂow
table timeout of our proposed DTP-ICM scheme.
5.3. Algorithm Complexity Analysis
As seen from the algorithm description above, the performance of our traﬃc500
partitioning scheme mainly depends on the ﬂow table lookups. According to
network traﬃc locality, packet traﬃc within a ﬂow can be modeled as a number
of packet trains, each of which consists of several packets in either direction. A
ﬂow is active when one of its trains is running and inactive if a train has passed
away and the next train has not come yet. Owing to the move-to-front heuristic,505
all active ﬂows will be shifted to the front of their located lists in the ﬂow table
while all inactive ﬂows will be pushed back to the rear. As a consequence, each
list in the ﬂow table can be divided into two parts, the front active ﬂow zone
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Table 3: The packet distribution of the DTP-ICM scheme
Pseudo-code for the distribution of a packet
Alogrithm 1 PacketDistribution(Packet p)
1. Parse the received packet p to get its key ﬁelds, including ipsrc, ipdst, portsrc, portdst, proto
2. p.FID ← {ipsrc, ipdst, portsrc, portdst, proto}
3. if p.proto = TCP , then
4. f ← FT search(FTp.proto, p.FID)
5. if f = NULL, then
6. k ← min
i
{LoadLevel(NPi)}
7. f ← NewFlow(p, k)
8. Forward the packet p to the network processor in the ﬂow f, and update the ﬂow f with the packet
p
9. FT insert(FTp.proto, f)
10. return 1
11.else return DTP-ICM TCP(p)
12.if p is a SYN, then
13. c ← ICT CBF search(p.FID)
14. if c = NULL, then
15. k ← min
i
{LoadLevel(NPi)}
16. c ← NewFlow(p, k)
17.else if p is a SYN/ACK or RST/ACK, then
18. c ← FT search(ICT , p.FID)
19.else c ← FT search(ECT , p.FID)
29.if c = NULL and p is a pure ACK, then
21. c ← FT search(ICT , p.FID)
22.if c =NULL, then
23. Forward the packet p to the network processor in the connection c, and update the connection c
with the packet p
24. if c is not yet established, then
25. ICT CBF insert(c)
26. else if c is terminated, then
27. delete c
28. else FT insert(ECT , c)
29. return 1
30.else return 0
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Table 4: The ﬂow table timeout of the DTP-ICM scheme
Pseudo-code for the timeout scanning of a ﬂow table
Alogrithm 2 Timeout(FlowTable table)
1. if table is the ICT, then
2. if table.size > ICT MAX SIZE, then
3. ICT CBF timeout(1);
4. else
5. ICT CBF timeout(4);
6. else if table is the ECT, then
7. FT timeout(ECT, 60);
8. else
9. FT timeout(table, 60);
and the rear inactive ﬂow zone.
Suppose a ﬂow table has the load factor α, and β is the ratio of the amount510
of active ﬂows to its table length. With simple uniform distribution assumption,
each list in the table can be deemed to consist of β ﬂows in the front active zone
and α − β ones in the rear inactive zone. As for a ﬂow with n trains the ith
of which contains mi packets, we can count the search length for each train.
As for the ith train, when its ﬁrst packet comes, its ﬂow is staying in the rear515
inactive zone. Thus we need take β to travel through the front active zone and
(α− β + 1)/2 to ﬁnd out the ﬂow in the rear inactive zone. Therefore, the ﬁrst
packet of the ith train needs to take the search length SLi,0(0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) in
(5) to locate its ﬂow.
SLi,0 = β +
α− β + 1
2
=
α+ β + 1
2
. (5)
As for each subsequent packet within the train, the ﬂow has been shifted520
to the front active zone at the arrival of its ﬁrst packet. Hence we can directly
ﬁnd out the ﬂow in the front active zone with the search length SLi,j(0 ≤ i ≤
n− 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ mi − 1) in (6).
SLi,j =
β + 1
2
. (6)
In summary, we can get the total search length for the ith train TSLi(0 ≤
23
i ≤ n− 1) in (7).525
TSLi =
mi−1∑
j=0
SLi,j = SLi,0 +
mi−1∑
j=1
SLi,j =
α+mi(β + 1)
2
. (7)
Suppose the average size of all packet trains is denoted as m = 1n
∑n−1
i=0 mi,
we can compute the average search length ASL in (8).
ASL =
∑n−1
i=0 TSLi∑n−1
i=0 mi
=
β + 1
2
+
α
2m
. (8)
As seen from (8), the lookup eﬃciency of a ﬂow table chieﬂy depends on its
load factor α, the average number of active ﬂows in each list β, and the average
size of all packet trains m. The length of the ﬂow table is generally conﬁgured530
as 216. There are usually no more than 220 simultaneous ﬂows in high-speed
networks, and α is expected to be less than 24. The amount of active ﬂows is
measured as no more than 216, and β is reckoned to value less than 1. The
packet train size varies widely from several to more than a hundred, and m is
supposed to be larger than 23. In summary, we can conclude that the ASL535
is likely to be smaller than 2. In contrast, a naive ﬂow table performs lookup
with the average search length (α+1)/2, which is much larger than that of our
proposed scheme in (8).
6. Experiments
This section evaluates the performance of our proposed traﬃc partitioning540
scheme DTP-ICM with physical network traﬃc traces in terms of traﬃc load
balance and packet distribution performance.
6.1. Traﬃc Trace Properties
For convenient multiple evaluation and comparison, we operate network traf-
ﬁc partitioning oﬄine on traﬃc traces previously captured from high-speed net-545
work links. The traces for our evaluation should contain a large number of
simultaneous ﬂows. Unfortunately, most published traﬃc traces are unsatis-
factory because of anonymization. Eventually we employ the traﬃc traces[37]
24
collected from a 10Gps main channel in the CERNET (Jiangsu). In particular,
we select 4 traﬃc traces, each with 15,420,235 packets, whose properties are550
illustrated in Table.5.
Table 5: The properties of the 4 traﬃc traces used in our experiments.
Traﬃc trace Duration TCP
packets
UDP
packets
Initial con-
nections
Established
connections
Terminated
connections
UDP
sessions
TRACE20141109 35.4s 8.84M 6.49M 307K 75.7K 61.9K 266K
TRACE20140509 58.3s 9.21M 6.09M 195K 92.6K 74.7K 125K
TRACE20120921 86.4s 11.5M 3.52M 324K 142K 139K 72.9K
TRACE20120725 83.7s 9.79M 5.05M 318K 95.7K 89.9K 77.3K
Fig.5 shows the number of simultaneous ﬂows in the traces, which has a
signiﬁcant impact on the performance of dynamic traﬃc partitioning scheme.
The number is counted by setting a timeout interval for each type of ﬂow. In
particular, we respectively set 4s, 60s and 60s as the timeout interval of initial555
TCP connections, established TCP connections and UDP sessions. As seen
from Fig.5, the number of initial connections usually falls between 10K and
35K, and that of established connections grows from 15K to 50K in a slow
rate. In stark contrast, the number of UDP sessions sharply increases from 60K
to more than 260K. This is probably because of the popularity of UDP-based560
network applications such as VOIP, IPTV and online video websites.
6.2. Traﬃc Load Balance
We contrast among load balancing capacities of typical traﬃc partitioning
schemes based on the deﬁnition of load imbalance degree.
1) Load Imbalance Degree565
To quantize the load balance extent of network traﬃc partitioning, we deﬁne
load imbalance degree by employing sample variance in mathematical statistics[24].
We ﬁrst deﬁne the ideal probability pi(0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1) of a packet distributed to
the ith network processor as the benchmark of the balance evaluation. In par-
ticular, pi can be calculated as the weight of the capacity Ci of the ith network570
processor among total capacity of all network processors in (9).
25
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Figure 5: The number of simultaneous ﬂows in the traﬃc traces.
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pi =
Ci∑N−1
j=0 Cj
. (9)
Similarly, we further deﬁne the actual probability p′i(t) of a packet dis-
tributed to the ith network processor at time t. In particular, p′i(t) can be
computed as the weight of the load Li(t) of the ith network processor among
total load of all network processors at time t in (10).575
p′i(t) =
Li(t)∑N−1
j=0 Lj(t)
. (10)
With the above deﬁnitions, we deﬁne the following load imbalance degree
I(t) of traﬃc partitioning at time t in virtue of the concept and formula of
sample standard deviation.
I(t) =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N−1∑
i=0
(
p′i(t)− pi
)2
. (11)
As seen from the above deﬁnition, I(t) characterizes the real-time load bal-
ance extent of network traﬃc partitioning (0 ≤ I(t) ≤ 1). The more I(t) comes580
close to 0, the more the traﬃc load distributes evenly.
2) Load Balance Comparison
We compare the load balance capacity of dynamic traﬃc partitioning scheme
(DTP) with those of the traditional ones, i.e., direct hashing and hash space
division (HSD). The key to the direct hashing schemes is to choose a uniform585
hash function with low cost. Network investigations indicate that BOB and
OAAT are the best candidates for packet processing among a collection of 25
hash functions[39][40]. So BOB and OAAT are selected as the representatives
of the direct hashing schemes. Besides, we select the MD5 algorithm for the
hash function in the HSD scheme.590
Suppose there are 3 network processors, whose processing capacities are
conﬁgured with the ratio 1:1:1 and 1:2:1 respectively. The traﬃc load of a
network processor is simply modeled as the addition of the quadruple number of
simultaneous ﬂows and the amount of distributed packets. Our experiments are
27
performed by reading packets from each traﬃc trace in their arrival orders and595
distributing them in terms of diﬀerent traﬃc partitioning schemes. Then, we
record the number of packets and ﬂows distributed to each network processor,
and calculate the load imbalance degree for each traﬃc partitioning scheme
according to (11). Finally, we get the load imbalance degrees of these traﬃc
partitioning schemes in Fig.6 and Fig.7.600
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Figure 6: The load imbalance degree in the case of 3 network processors conﬁgured with the
capacity ratio 1:1:1.
As seen from Fig.6 and Fig.7, the DTP scheme has better load balance
capacity than the other ones whether network processors are conﬁgured with
identical capacity or not. In particular, the DTP scheme almost always has the
lowest load imbalance degrees, and achieves ideal load balance eﬀect in most
cases. This is attributed to the fact that it dynamically distributes packets for605
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Figure 7: The load imbalance degree in the case of 3 network processors conﬁgured with the
capacity ratio 1:2:1.
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the purpose of the real-time balancing of traﬃc load distribution.
By contrast of Fig.6 and Fig.7, we can see that both the DTP and the
HSD schemes have excellent adaptability to diﬀerent network processor con-
ﬁgurations. In particular, their load imbalance degrees always fall below 0.25
whether the 3 network processors are conﬁgured with the capacity ratio 1:1:1610
or 1:2:1. This eﬀect is derived from that they adaptively distribute packets in
terms of network processor capacities. Owing to this property, both the schemes
have much better load balance eﬀect than the BOB and the OAAT for network
processors with diﬀerent capacities, while the case is completely diﬀerent for
same network processors.615
6.3. Packet Distribution Performance
Dynamic traﬃc partitioning scheme achieves excellent load balance eﬀect at
the cost of heavy packet distribution overheads. So it is necessary to com-
pare our proposed dynamic traﬃc partitioning scheme DTP-ICM with the
traditional one in terms of packet distribution performance. The traditional620
scheme[22][23][21][24] maintains simultaneous ﬂows of each protocol above IP
header in a naive hash table, called DTP-NHT. As for ﬂow tables in both
schemes, hash functions are all simply devised as the XOR operation of the ﬂow
identiﬁer folded by 16 bits for low cost, and their table lengths are uniformly sets
as the maximum 216. Besides, the counting bloom ﬁlter in our DTP-ICM scheme625
employs 6 hash functions, BOB, OAAT, TWMX, RS, Hsieh, and SBox[40].
As seen from the pseudo-code implementation in the previous section, the
ﬂow table lookups dominate the packet distribution performance of dynamic
traﬃc partitioning scheme. Thus, the average search length (ASL) is employed
to characterize the packet distribution performance, due to its independence of630
testing platforms. In particular, we count the search length and the number of
incoming packets, and calculate their quotient as the average search length.
Experiment 1 (Normal Conditions)
We ﬁrst compare the packet distribution performance of both dynamic traﬃc
partitioning schemes with the selected traces under normal conditions. The635
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counting bloom ﬁlter in our DTP-ICM scheme is conﬁgured in terms of its
equationm = nklog2e in the Section 4.3, where m, k and n respectively denotes
the number of counters, hash functions and initial connections in the ICT table.
As seen from Fig.5, the number of initial connections n is no more than 30K in
most cases. Then, the number of counters m is suitable to be set as 256K since640
the number of hash functions k equals to 6. With the above conﬁgurations, we
operate both dynamic traﬃc partitioning schemes on the selected traﬃc traces,
and evaluate the ASLs of both schemes for TCP and UDP traﬃc in Fig.8 and
Fig.9 respectively.
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Figure 8: The ASLs of TCP traﬃc partitioning.
As seen from Fig.8 and Fig.9, our proposed DTP-ICM scheme outperforms645
the DTP-NHT scheme for both TCP and UDP traﬃc. As for TCP traﬃc, our
DTP-ICM scheme performs packet distribution with the ASLs below 1 almost
31
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
time(s)
a
ve
ra
ge
 s
ea
rc
h 
le
ng
th
DTP−ICM
DTP−NHT
(a) TRACE20141109
10 20 30 40 50
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
time(s)
a
ve
ra
ge
 s
ea
rc
h 
le
ng
th
DTP−ICM
DTP−NHT
(b) TRACE20140509
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
time(s)
a
ve
ra
ge
 s
ea
rc
h 
le
ng
th
DTP−ICM
DTP−NHT
(c) TRACE20120921
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
time(s)
a
ve
ra
ge
 s
ea
rc
h 
le
ng
th DTP−ICM
DTP−NHT
(d) TRACE20120725
Figure 9: The ASLs of UDP traﬃc partitioning.
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at all times, while the ASLs of the DTP-NHT scheme always ﬂuctuate above 1.
This is chieﬂy attributed to our optimizations of TCP connection management,
i.e., the initial connection separation mechanism and the move-to-front heuristic.650
In particular, most TCP packets only need to look up one of the ICT and the
ECT tables divided from the original TCP connection table, and the successful
search length of a TCP packet is greatly shorten for the ECT table as a result of
network traﬃc locality. As for UDP traﬃc, the ASLs of the DTP-NHT scheme
rise up sharply due to the increasing number of simultaneous UDP ﬂows. As655
a striking contrast, our DTP-ICM scheme perform with much more steady and
shorter ASLs. This result thanks to the move-to-front heuristic applied to the
UDP session table.
Experiment 2 (SYN Flooding Attacks)
SYN ﬂooding attacks often have a great destructive power on dynamic traﬃc660
partitioning scheme. We compare the packet distribution performance of both
dynamic traﬃc partitioning schemes under the attacks. The attacks are simu-
lated by inserting falsiﬁed SYN packets into normal TCP traﬃc in our selected
traces. In particular, we mix normal packets in the trace with falsiﬁed packets
by diﬀerent hybrid ratio to simulate diﬀerent levels of the attacks.665
Our counting bloom ﬁlter is still conﬁgured in terms of the equation m =
nklog2e under SYN ﬂooding attacks. However, its parameter conﬁguration
varies with diﬀerent attack levels due to its impact on the number of initial
connections in the ICT table n. The table during the attacks is dominated by
unexpired false connections, whose amount depends on the timeout interval of670
each initial connection, the number of normal packets per second, and the hybrid
ratio of falsiﬁed packets and normal packets. The timeout interval is generally
adjusted to 1 second in the presence of the attacks[26][27]. The number of
normal packets per second in the trace is around 256K at all times illustrated
in Table.5. Besides, the number of hash functions k is ﬁxed as 6. In summary,675
the number of counters m can be conﬁgured as 2M times of the packet hybrid
ratio.
In our experiments, the falsiﬁed SYN packets are inserted into packet stream
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in the TRACE20141109, TRACE20140509, TRACE20120921 and TRACE20120725
respectively from the 10th, 20th, 30th and 30th second. Then we operate both680
dynamic traﬃc partitioning schemes on the hybrid packet traﬃc. Fig.10, Fig.11
and Fig.12 demonstrate the ASLs of both schemes with the packet hybrid ratio
1:1, 2:1 and 4:1 respectively.
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Figure 10: The ASLs with the packet hybrid ratio 1:1.
As seen from Fig.10, Fig.11 and Fig.12, our proposed DTP-ICM scheme
performs packet distribution at much shorter ASLs than the traditional DTP-685
NHT scheme. In particular, the DTP-ICM scheme always takes steady and
short search lengths no matter how ﬁerce the attacks are. In contrast, the
DTP-NHT scheme degrades sharply in the emergence of SYN ﬂooding attacks.
What is more exciting is that, the DTP-ICM scheme get even shorter ASLs
when the attacks become more severe. In summary, our proposed DTP-ICM690
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Figure 11: The ASLs with the packet hybrid ratio 2:1.
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Figure 12: The ASLs with the packet hybrid ratio 4:1.
36
scheme provides much better robustness against SYN ﬂooding attacks than the
traditional one. This is attributed to the fact that all falsiﬁed SYN packets no
longer need to search any ﬂow tables due to the application of the counting
bloom ﬁlter to the ICT table.
7. Conclusion and Future Work695
This paper proposes a novel dynamic traﬃc partitioning scheme DTP-ICM,
which assigns a new ﬂow to a network processor with the lightest traﬃc load
level and distributes all packets within a ﬂow to its network processor, to guar-
antee ﬂow granularity and achieve good load balance. In the scheme, we build
the initial connection separation mechanism to isolate false TCP connections700
induced by malicious behaviors, which results in two connection tables, the ICT
and the ECT. The move-to-front heuristic is applied to the ECT table and the
UDP ﬂow table to accelerate their lookups and to the ICT table to speed up its
timeout scanning. More importantly, the ICT table is optimized with counting
bloom ﬁlters to defend against SYN ﬂooding attacks.705
Our proposed DTP-ICM scheme is evaluated with real network traﬃc traces.
The evaluation results indicate that the DTP-ICM scheme achieves good load
balance eﬀect and high packet distribution performance. In particular, the DTP-
ICM scheme perform packet distribution with steady and short ASLs below 1
almost at all times for both TCP and UDP traﬃc. More excitingly, the DTP-710
ICM scheme still takes steady and short search lengths no matter how ﬁerce the
attacks are.
In our future work, more traﬃc traces from diﬀerent high-speed network
lines will be utilized to evaluate and validate our proposed traﬃc partitioning
scheme. After that, we plan to deploy it in speciﬁc network applications such715
as content delivery. Furthermore, applications of our proposed scheme to the
environment of future networks, such as software deﬁned networks, is also within
our future work plan.
37
Acknowledgment
This work was supported in part by National Natural Science Foundation of720
China (61502056, 61303043), Hunan Provincial Natural Science Foundation of
China (2015JJ3010, 13JJ4052), and Scientiﬁc Research Fund of Hunan Provin-
cial Education Department (15B009, 14C0285).
References
[1] E.W. Fulp, R.J. Farley. A Function-Parallel Architecture for High-Speed725
Firewalls. In: Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Communi-
cations, Istanbul, 2006. 2213-2218.
[2] A. Patel, M. Taghavi, K. Bakhtiyari, J. C. Junior. An intrusion detection
and prevention system in cloud computing: A systematic review. Journal of
Network and Computer Applications, 2013, 36(1): 25-41.730
[3] G. Vasiliadis, M. Polychronakis, S. Ioannidis. MIDeA: a multi-parallel intru-
sion detection architecture. In: Proceedings of ACM conference on Computer
and Communications Security. 2011. 297-308.
[4] G. Cheng, J. Gong, W. Ding. Distributed sampling measurement model
in a high speed network based on statistical analysis. Chinese Journal of735
Computers, 2003, 26(10): 1266-1273.
[5] Z. H. Zhang. Distribute and Match - The DM Switch for High Speed Packet
Switching Networks. In: Proceedings of IEEE Global Telecommunications
Conference, 2011. 1-6.
[6] S. Manfredi, F. Oliviero, S. P. Romano. A Distributed Control Law for740
Load Balancing in Content Delivery Networks. IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking, 2012, 21(1): 55-68.
[7] N. Mohamed, J. Al-Jaroodi, A. Eid. A dual-direction technique for fast ﬁle
downloads with dynamic load balancing in the Cloud. Journal of Network
and Computer Applications, 2013, 36(4): 1116-1130.745
38
[8] A. Hakiri, A. Gokhale, P. Berthou, D. C. Schmidt, T. Gayraud. Software-
Deﬁned Networking: Challenges and research opportunities for Future In-
ternet. Computer Networks, 2014, 75(24): 453-471.
[9] D. Kreutz, F. M. V. Ramos, P. Verissimo, E. C. Rothenberg, S. Azodolmolky,
S. Uhlig. Software-deﬁned networking: A comprehensive survey. Proceedings750
of the IEEE, 2015, 103(1): 14-76.
[10] M. Koerner, O. Kao. Multiple Service Load-Balancing with OpenFlow. In:
Proceedings of the IEEE 13th International Conference on High Performance
Switching and Routing (HPSR), 2012: 210-214.
[11] M. Bredel, Z. Bozakovy, A. Barczyk, H. Newman. Flow-Based Load Balanc-755
ing in Multipathed Layer-2 Networks using OpenFlow and Multipath-TCP.
In: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Hot topics in
software deﬁned networking (HotSDN), 2014: 213-214.
[12] Y. Qi, B. Xu, F. He, B. Yang, J. M. Yu, J. Li. Towards high-performance
ﬂow-level packet processing on multi-core network processors. In: Proceed-760
ings of ACM/IEEE Symposium on Architectures for Networking and Com-
munications Systems. Orlando, 2007. 17-26.
[13] Z. H. Zhao, Y. T. Shu, L. F. Zhang, H. M. Wang, O. W. W. Yang. Flow-
level multipath load balancing in MPLS network. In: Proceedings of IEEE
International Conference on Communications, Paris, 2004, 2: 1222-1226.765
[14] A. Kirsch, M. Mitzenmacher, G. Varghese. Hash-based techniques for high-
speed packet processing. Algorithms for Next Generation Networks (Com-
puter Communications and Networks), 2010, 2:181-218.
[15] Z. Cao, Z. Wang, E. Zegura. Performance of Hashing-based Schemes for
Internet Load Balancing. In: Proceedings of IEEE International Conference770
on Computer Communications. Tel-Aviv, Israel, 2000: 332-341.
[16] H. Lai, H. Huang, J. Xie. PABCS: A Traﬃc Partition Algorithm for Parallel
Intrusion Detection. Chinese Journal of Computers, 2007, 30(4): 555-562.
39
[17] Y. Chen, X. Lu, X. Shi, et al. A Session-oriented Adaptive Load Balancing
Algorithm. Journal of Software, 2008, 19(7): 1828-1836.775
[18] Q. Sun, D. Zhang, P. Gao, et al. Study of Parallel IDS Load Balancing
Algorithm. Mini-micro Systems, 2004, 25(12): 2215-2217.
[19] W. Shi, M. H. MacGregor, P. Gburzynski. Load Balancing for Parallel
Forwarding. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2005, 13(4): 790-801.
[20] L. Kencl, J. L. Boudec. Adaptive Load Sharing for Network Processors.780
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2008, 16(2): 293-306.
[21] X. Li, D. Zhao, H. Zhao, et al. Research on Application-based Network
Intrusion Detection System for High-speed Network. Journal of China Insti-
tute of Communications, 2002, 23(9): 1-7.
[22] W. Jiang, H. Song, Y. Dai. Real-time Intrusion Detection for High-speed785
Networks. Computers and Security, 2005, 24(4): 287 294.
[23] W. Jiang, S. Hao, Y. Dai, et al. Load Balancing Algorithm for High-speed
Network Intrusion Detection Systems. Journal of Tsinghua University (Sci-
ence and Technology), 2006, 46(1): 106-110.
[24] B. Xiong, H. Xiao, M. Long, et al. Dynamic Partitioning of High-speed790
Network Traﬃc with Flow Level. Mini-micro Systems, 2013, 34(5): 945-950.
[25] K. Thompson, G. J. Miller, R. Wilder. Wide-Area Internet Traﬃc Patterns
and Characteristics. IEEE Network, 1997, 11: 10-23.
[26] H. Kim, J. Kim, I. Kang, et al. Preventing Session Table Explosion in
Packet Inspection Computers. IEEE Transactions on Computers, 2005,795
54(2): 238-240.
[27] I. Kang, H. Kim. Determining Embryonic Connection Timeout in Stateful
Inspection. In: Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Commu-
nications, Anchorage, Alaska, 2003: 458-462.
40
[28] C. Williamson. Internet Traﬃc Measurement. IEEE Internet Computing,800
2001, 5(6): 70-74.
[29] N. Gulati, C. Williamson, R. Bunt. LAN Traﬃc Locality: Characterization
and Application. In: Proceedings of International Conference in Local Area
Network Interconnection. North Carolina, 1993: 233-250.
[30] Y. Liu, L. Guo, F. Li, et al. A Case Study of Traﬃc Locality in Internet805
P2P Live Streaming Systems. In: Proceedings of International Conference
on Distributed Computing Systems. Montreal, Canada, 2009: 423-432.
[31] H. Wang, J. Liu, B. Chen, et al. On Tracker Selection for Peer-to-Peer
Traﬃc Locality. In: Proceedings of International Conference on Peer-to-Peer
Computing. Delft, Netherlands, 2010: 1-10.810
[32] B. Xiong, F. Li, L. Jiang, et al. An eﬃcient oriented-hash table for connec-
tion management in high-speed networks. Journal of Huazhong University
of Science and Technology (Natural Science Edition), 2011, 39(2): 19-22.
[33] B. Bloom, Space/time trade-oﬀs in hash coding with allowable errors. Com-
munications of the ACM, 1970, 13(7): 422-426.815
[34] L. Fan, P. Cao, J. Almeida, et al. Summary cache: A scalable wide-area
web cache sharing protocol. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 2000,
8(3):281-293.
[35] S. Cohen, Y. Matias. Spectral Bloom Filters. In: Proceedings of 2003 ACM
SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data. New York:820
ACM Press, 2003. 241-252.
[36] K. R. Fall, R. W. Stevens. TCP/IP Illustrated, Volume 1: The Protocols
(2nd Edition). Boston, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 2011.
[37] Network traﬃc traces. http://iptas.edu.cn/src/system.php. 2015.
41
[38] B. Xiong, K. Yang, F. Li, et al. The Impact of Bitwise Operators on Hash825
Uniformity in Network Packet Processing. International Journal of Commu-
nication Systems, 2014, 27(11): 3158-3184.
[39] C. Henke, C. Schmoll, T. Zseby. Empirical evaluation of hash functions
for multipoint measurements. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication
Review, 2008, 38(3): 41-50.830
[40] M. Molina, S. Niccolini, N.G. Duﬃeld. A comparative experimental study of
hash functions applied to packet sampling. In: Proceedings of International
Teletraﬃc Congress (ITC-19), Beijing, 2005. 1-11.
42
